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GLD-035        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3066 
 ___________ 
 
JAMES COPPEDGE, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST; 
MARTHA E. VON ROSENSTIEL, ESQ.; 
JACQUELINE F. MCNALLY, ESQ. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-03268) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and for Possible 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 8, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: January 22, 2013 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 James Coppedge appeals the denial of his request for a preliminary injunction.  
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We will affirm. 
 In June 2012, Coppedge filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Basing his action on, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
Coppedge appeared to challenge a mortgage-related proceeding that was currently 
ongoing in Pennsylvania state court, and raised several arguments associated with the 
“sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist” movements.1  For example, he contested a writ of 
judgment that used his “corporate issue name” (using all upper-case letters, see Ford v. 
Pryor
 Shortly after paying the filing fee, Coppedge lodged two other documents with the 
District Court.  The first document was captioned “Motion for Injunction and Emergency 
Stay” (ECF No. 006), and seemed to request that the District Court enjoin the pending 
state-court writ of possession.  Its attachments included an affidavit submitted to the 
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County—in which Coppedge represented that he 
intended to “appeal” that court’s decision to the Federal District Court—and a July 2012 
order denying a request for summary judgment.  The second document was captioned 
“Motion to Dismiss Writ of Possession due to Fraud . . . Emergency Stay and Injunction” 
, 552 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2008)) and proclaimed that there was “no lawful 
money.”  He demanded that each defendant “produce a Certified Copy of each of [his or 
her] OATHS OF OFFICE with an attached Bond to PROVE they have legal and lawful 
standing to operate in commerce against [Coppedge], a Secured Party Creditor.”   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2011); Bey v. 
Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539–46 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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(ECF No. 007).  It argued that a writ of possession was voided in 2010 and that the state 
courts were erroneously allowing the voided writ to be acted upon.  The District Court 
denied both motions, citing two grounds for declining to issue the requested injunction: 
abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and a possible jurisdictional bar 
under the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine.  In so doing, it acknowledged Coppedge’s similar 
actions in other District Courts.  See, e.g., Coppedge v. Beaumont
 “[O]rders granting or denying preliminary injunctions are immediately appealable 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).”  
, No. 10–394, 2010 WL 
2382944 (D. Del. June 11, 2010).  Coppedge timely appealed; the case otherwise remains 
open in District Court at the time of writing. 
Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., 112 F.3d 689, 
692 (3d Cir. 1997).3  We review generally for abuse of discretion, but we examine the 
Court’s underlying factual findings for clear error and address questions of law de novo.  
N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff
 Coppedge has not shown that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction, as he did 
not meet the burden, which he bears, of establishing his right to injunctive relief.  
, 669 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2012).   
See 
Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc.
                                                                                                                                                             
 
, 268 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 
2 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923). 
 
3 Having analyzed Coppedge’s original filings and the order of the District Court, we 
conclude that he was requesting preliminary injunctive relief and not merely a temporary 
restraining order.  Were this not the case, we would lack jurisdiction.  Nutrasweet, 112 
F.3d at 692.   
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1959).  “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public interest.”  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  
Neither Coppedge’s complaint nor his subsequent submissions demonstrated a likelihood 
of success on the merits.  In fact, he explicitly stated that he wanted the District Court to 
sit in appellate review of state-court proceedings, a role specifically prohibited by 
Rooker-Feldman.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “prohibited exercise of appellate jurisdiction by 
the district court”).  Further, in order for Younger abstention to apply (subject to certain 
exceptions that are not implicated here), there must be 1) ongoing state judicial 
proceedings, 2) implicating important state interests, 3) that give the parties an adequate 
opportunity to raise the relevant federal claims.  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 
& n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  The District Court identified “pending state court 
proceedings involving Coppedge and Deutsche Bank raising issues directly related to 
those raised by Coppedge in this matter,” and observed that Pennsylvania has “an 
important interest in resolving real estate issues” in its courts.  Coppedge has not cast any 
doubt on the existence and adequacy of the Pennsylvania judicial proceedings, and when 
the first and third prongs of the Younger
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 test are met, “neither injunctive nor declaratory 
relief will be available in cases in which the federal relief would render the state court’s 
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orders or judgments nugatory.”  Id. at 671 (citations omitted).4
Thus, finding no substantial question to be presented by this appeal, we will 
summarily affirm the order of the District Court.  
  
See Murray v. Bledsoe
                                                 
4 We separately observe that real estate, and especially the regulation, titling, and sale 
thereof, has traditionally been regarded as an important state interest.  See, e.g., BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (citing Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 
U.S. 47, 60 (1911)); Burkart v. Coleman (In re Tippett), 542 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citing BFP); Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that “the regulation of real estate professionals engaged in the business of 
timeshare brokerage” qualifies as “a valid, legitimate state interest” under the second 
prong of the Younger test); see also Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 671 n.5; Witco Corp. v. 
Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Probate law, like real estate law and 
domestic relations law, has traditionally been within the province of the individual 
states.”) (emphasis added). 
, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  Coppedge’s additional submissions to this Court, to the 
extent that they request any independent relief, are denied.  In closing, we note that 
Coppedge’s sovereign-citizen-based averments, which frequently rely on attacks on the 
judiciary and invocations of alchemistic, archaic, and irrelevant formalism, are unlikely 
to bring him relief in any court of law, and he would be wise to direct his energies in a 
more productive direction.  
